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Abstract. Decision makers query enterprise information stored in DataWarehouses
(DW) by using tools (such as On-Line Analytical Processing (OLAP) tools) which
employ specific views or cubes from the corporate DW or Data Marts, based on
multidimensional modelling. Since the information managed is critical, security
constraints have to be correctly established in order to avoid unauthorized access. In
previous work we defined a Model-Driven based approach for developing a secure
DW repository by following a relational approach. Nevertheless, it is also important
to define security constraints in the metadata layer that connects the DW repository
with the OLAP tools; that is, over the same multidimensional structures that end
users manage. This paper incorporates a proposal for developing secure OLAP ap-
plications within our previous approach: it improves a UML profile for conceptual
modelling; it defines a logical metamodel for OLAP applications; and it defines and
implements transformations from conceptual to logical models, as well as from log-
ical models to secure implementation in a specific OLAP tool (SQL Server Analysis
Services).
Keywords: security, confidentiality, OLAP, data warehouses, MDD, MDA, QVT,
MOFScript, SSAS.
1. Introduction
Data Warehouses manage a vast amount of sensitive information which has to be prop-
erly assured, since this information has a great strategic value for organizations and, what
is more, it includes private data of individuals [57, 62]. In this sense, information confi-
dentiality is the main security-related problem that has to be tackled in the access to the
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data warehouse, since end users will carry out reading operations only [45, 65, 10]. Secu-
rity has traditionally been considered in the final implementation of the data warehouse,
but its inclusion in early development stages can produce more robust and higher-quality
solutions, due to the fact that security requirements are taken into account in making de-
sign decisions, and also because the system can accommodate them in a more natural
way [17, 1]. On the other hand, given that the data warehouse design process involves the
traditional development stages in which the system is modelled at business, conceptual
and logical level and then eventually the final solution is implemented, the model-driven
engineering approach can be applied [41, 20, 38].
There are proposals for developing secure data warehouses based on the automated
development of the software by means of model definition and transformations between
models, reducing the development time and cost as a consequence. Despite the fact that
security constraints can be applied on the central repository of the data warehouse, they
can generate inconsistencies with the access layer, in which OLAP tools that enable users
to access the data warehouse are located. This is because security specifications carried
out on the data warehouse repository do not use OLAP technology-related concepts (such
as cubes, aggregation levels, roll-up and drill-down operations, etc.) and are not specif-
ically defined for each multidimensional view included in the departmental data marts
accessed by users. From now on, we will refer to departmental data marts, by which we
mean that we are working with a data warehouse focused on a departmental data mart.
All of the above considerations lead us to see that there is a need for an approach for
OLAP applications which supports the definition of security constraints over the same
multidimensional elements managed by end users [57]. These multidimensional elements
are managed by the end users when querying the data warehouse and demonstrate how
these users interact with the data warehouse by means of OLAP operations.
This paper presents an approach for the development of secure OLAP applications,
by including security in the intermediate layer that connects OLAP applications with
the DW repository. In order to achieve this goal, the models and transformations needed
to develop secure OLAP applications have been defined. This proposal has been also
integrated into previous architecture which adopts the model-driven paradigm to model
the DW repository and automatically generate its secure implementation according to a
relational approach.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will describe related work;
Section 3 will present our MDA approach for developing secure OLAP applications, giv-
ing (1) an introduction to our conceptual model (PIM), (2) the multidimensional logical
metamodel (PSM) for secure OLAP applications defined in this paper as an extension of
the OLAP package from CWM and (3) the transformations created in this paper to imple-
ment the secure OLAP application automatically in a specific OLAP tool (SSAS) from
the conceptual model; Section 4 will describe the application of our proposal to a DW for
a sales department; and finally, Section 5 will present our conclusions and future work.
2. Related Work
This section presents relevant works related to our proposal. It has been organized in
several subsections that focus on proposals for secure information systems, secure DWs
and secure OLAP applications.
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2.1. Security on Information Systems
There are relevant contributions concerning a complete secure development of informa-
tion systems. Although they do not focus specifically on DWs and their specific security
problems, they present interesting ideas, such as proposals to include security constraints
from the earliest development stages, to extend UML with security aspects, to use the
model-driven approach, etc. Some of the most relevant proposals are described below.
TROPOS is a methodology for software development based on the intentional goals
of agents; it provides an extension called Secure TROPOS [18, 32, 8]. Together, these in-
clude security concepts (constraints, secure goals, delegation of permissions, etc.) and
activities (trust of permission modelling, delegation of permission modelling, etc.), pre-
senting a framework that allows us to model and analyze security requirements within
functional requirements. Furthermore, they provide a CASE tool (ST-Tool) that supports
requirements analysis and verification.
Mokum [47], which is an active object-oriented knowledge-based system for model-
ing, permits the specification of security and integrity constraints, along with automatic
code generation.
Some work proposes processes based on security models and standards for building
security systems. Such is the case, for instance, with the process known as PSSS (Process
to Support Software Security) [39] which is based on the activities derived from SSE-
CMM, ISO/IEC 15408, ISO/IEC 27002 and OCTAVE.
UMLsec [22] defines and evaluates security specifications using formal semantics
(labels, stereotypes, etc.). It focuses mainly on accessing control policies and in the spec-
ification of confidentiality and integrity requirements. UMsec uses the majority of UML
diagrams and has been recently adapted to UML 2 [23].
The model-driven approach is based on the definition on different models that separate
the specification of system functionalities and their implementation by using a specific
technology. With this approach, the development process can be automated by defining
transformations that are able to generate the final implementation from models. This ap-
proach has been successfully applied to different software development areas, improving
the development process, thus reducing times and costs, as well as the quality obtained
in the final product [16, 36]. Some examples of application are: data bases [61, 27, 11,
60], data warehouses [34, 62, 12], web services [35, 54, 67, 26], functional usability, prod-
uct lines [7], data schema mappings using waving metamodels enriched with OCL con-
straints, critical applications or real-time systems [9, 30, 64].
Model-driven Security (MDS) [4] applies the model-driven approach to include secu-
rity properties in high-level system models and to automatically generate secure system
architectures. For the modelling of the system it proposes a UML extension called Se-
cureUML [29] that permits the inclusion of access control aspects into the models. MDS
has been applied to UMLsec [5], defining three abstraction levels (requirements, mod-
elling and implementation) and providing tools for code generation, reverse engineering,
verification and configuration [24]. Furthermore, some pieces of work are developing
transformations between SecureUML and UMLsec [33].
2.2. Security on DWs
A typical DW architecture is composed of several layers: heterogeneous data sources;
ETL (extraction/transformation/load) processes, which extract and transform data from
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these data sources and load the information into the DW; the repository of the DW, where
data are stored; and DBMS and OLAP tools which analyze data. Since DWs have mainly
dealt with read operations on sensitive information used for decision making, the main
security problem related to DWs is information confidentiality; this should be taken into
account in all layers and operations of the DW. Each layer of this architecture presents
specific security concerns, which are described in the rest of this section.
Since data sources are heterogeneous and can use different security policies (such as
discretional access control - DAC, mandatory access control - MAC or role based access
control - RBAC), the security problem concerning this layer is related to their integration
into the DW design, and there is a similar problem in Federated Information Systems
(FIS).
Security policies defined in data sources are specified bearing in mind that users of
data sources could be different from the end users. We believe that the integration of
these is not enough in and of itself to completely establish the DW security policy. There
are indeed sensitive data which should be assured regardless of end users, however (for
instance, to comply with legal regulations) and the integration of security constraints for
these could be an interesting starting point for establishing a DW security policy.
There are several pieces of work that deal with the integration of different security
policies in FIS [56, 21]. Saltor et al. [48] use this parallelism to adapt design architec-
ture for FIS to DWs; they also set out to improve it with security capabilities supporting
the integration of MAC policies. Since ETL processes extract and transform information
from data sources which is finally loaded into the DW, it is important that ETL processes
also take security information into account. However, although proposals for conceptual
modeling of ETL processes exist, they do not support security issues [52, 51, 58, 37].
As regards a complete secure DW development, we found only the methodology of
Priebe and Pernul [46], in which the authors analyze security requirements and their im-
plementation in commercial tools by hiding multidimensional elements such as cubes,
measures, slices and levels. They extend their proposal with a DW representation at con-
ceptual level with ADAPTed UML, but they do not establish the connection between
models so that automatic transformations can take place.
On the other hand, there are several pieces of work which focus on secure model-
ing for DWs at certain abstraction levels. At business level there are proposals based on
ontologies, business process, UML, etc. but only Paim and Castro [43] include security
requirements; they do not offer any formal metamodel, however.
At the conceptual level there is some interesting work for modeling DWs that consid-
ers their special characteristics by using extensions of the ER model, UML or a notation
of their own, but they do not include security capabilities [19, 49, 59, 6, 31, 44]. The con-
ceptual modeling of security issues is considered only by the AdaptedUML of Priebe and
Pernul [46].
Traditionally, multidimensional modeling at logical level has depended on the DBMS
used and in this way in online analytical processing can be classified mainly into rela-
tional (ROLAP), multidimensional (MOLAP) and hybrid (HOLAP) approaches. There
are many modeling proposals which do not consider security; only CWM [40] provides a
formal metamodel with relational and multidimensional packages.
A number of interesting proposals have come into being recently in the context of
security in cloud data warehouses and big data [55]. These include proposals such as an
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approach for securing cloud data warehouses by flexible verifiable secret sharing [3, 2],
a security framework in Hadoop for big data computing across distributed Cloud data
centres [68], or a solution for privacy that preserves medical data sharing in a cloud [66].
2.3. Security on OLAP applications
End-user tools also have to consider security constraints in their quest to avoid unautho-
rized access. Research efforts have traditionally been carried out in this way, but they
have focused on the final stage of development without including security issues in the
whole development process. For instance, Kirkgoze et al. propose a virtual cube for each
subject [25], while Weippl et al. define an access control model for DWs; OLAP, for its
part, makes it possible to define the OLAP operations authorized for each user [65].
Nevertheless, the problem of inference is still a challenge in present-day DW secu-
rity, and it is an important research branch [57]. Since DWs store sensitive data by using
different aggregation levels with a range of confidentiality requirements (for example, the
average salary may be Unclassified, and individual salaries Secret), the inference prob-
lem is similar to the problem that has already been studied as regards statistical databases
which store summarized data as sums or averages [50]. Some pieces of work have dealt
with inference by proposing query control systems [63, 28, 53].
2.4. Discussion
Our research efforts focus on considering security in the whole DW development process,
from the early stages of the development lifecycle. Our proposal defines several models
which are improved with security capabilities, and aligns them with an MDA architec-
ture, also providing the transformation rules needed to generate secure implementation
automatically.
After analyzing the related work, we consider that the proposals described above
present interesting ideas about how to include security in the whole development pro-
cess of information systems, but none of them has data warehouses and OLAP as their
focus of attention. This kind of systems presents specific structural characteristics (facts,
dimensions, hierarchies, measures, etc.) as well as security aspects that have to be cor-
rectly specified for them.
Our analysis continued by describing some proposals for securing a specific DW de-
velopment stage (data source integration, ETL and DW modelling). The most interesting
one for the scope of this work was AdaptedUML, which we were able to use in our
proposal for the conceptual modelling stage. Nevertheless, since AdaptedUML does not
establish the connection between models in order to allow automatic transformations, we
decided to use the SECDW UML profile that we had defined in previous work.
Finally, we focused on security models for a specific technology, OLAP. Since end
users access the data warehouse by using OLAP tools, security constraints need to be be
defined according to the concepts associated with the OLAP technology (cubes, aggre-
gation levels, roll-up and drill-down operations, etc.). The proposals analysed center on
the implementation stage, defining specific access control models, or extending languages
used by the OLAP tools (such us MDX). Our work aims to define a model for OLAP, but
at a high level of abstraction, separate from the implementation; in other words, our objec-
tive was to establish a common model that represents both the structural and the security
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aspects, independently of the particular end-user OLAP tool to be used. This model can
thus be employed to generate automatically the final implementation for a specific tool
through transformations.
Taking all the above points into account, this paper presents a solution for developing
secure OLAP applications that consider the whole development process, including secu-
rity aspects from the earlier stages and allowing us to define security constraints associated
with the same views, as well as multidimensional elements which will be managed by the
end users. This proposal is based on models and transformations, defining a model-driven
architecture able to generate the secure implementation from models automatically. De-
signers use our conceptual model to establish security constraints in a simple way and
then the system is deployed accordingly. This is carried out in two stages; firstly, a logi-
cal model is automatically generated through transformations and then from this logical
model we obtain automatically the final implementation that includes all the MDX ex-
pressions needed for each role. The system deployed is consistent with the conceptual
model, and each change made in the model is deployed by following the same automatic
process.
3. An MDA architecture for developing Secure OLAP Applications
This section presents our approach for developing secure OLAP applications, so that the
reader may understand the context of this paper. Previous work did form a complete archi-
tecture (Figure 1) but focused solely on a relational approach and the final implementation
in DBMS [13]. At the business level, a computational independent metamodel (CIM) sup-
ports an early definition of the security requirements by using a UML profile based on the
i* framework.
A platform independent model (PIM) makes it possible for us to define the secure con-
ceptual model of the DW. At this stage we use a UML profile called SECDW. It is based
on a UML profile created specifically for conceptual modeling of DWs, complemented
with an Access Control and Audit (ACA) model. It permits a classification of subjects and
objects into hierarchies of roles (SR), horizontal classifications of compartments (SC) and
clearance levels (SL). Furthermore, the ACA model enables there to be a definition of se-
curity rules: sensitive information assignment rules (SIAR); authorization rules (AUR);
and audit rules (AR).
Following a relational approach at logical level (ROLAP), a Specific Platform Meta-
model (PSM) called SECRDW (Secure Relational Data Warehouse) has been defined as
an extension of the relational package from the Common Warehouse Metamodel [40].
SECRDW models relational elements such as tables, columns, or keys, and expresses the
security rules defined at conceptual level. Moreover, the automatic transformation from
conceptual models to relational logical models has been implemented by using QVT; the
eventual implementation into a DBMS has been dealt with by Oracle Label Security.
Since most DWs are queried by OLAP tools following a multidimensional approach,
this paper completes our architecture by including a new logical multidimensional model
for secure OLAP applications, called SECMDDW (Secure Multidimensional Data Ware-
house) and the final implementation in an OLAP tool (SSAS). Furthermore, the transfor-
mations needed to integrate that model into our architecture (T1 and T2 in Figure 1) have
been defined. All these elements will be explained in the following sections.
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Fig. 1.Model driven architecture for developing Secure DWs.
The process of applying our approach is composed of several stages.
– Firstly, designers use our conceptual model to establish security constraints in a sim-
ple way by using our UML profile. They model both the structural and the security
aspects of the DW.
– The system is automatically deployed in accord with this model and it is consistent
with the conceptual model. That is, each change made in the conceptual model is de-
ployed by following the same automatic process. The deployment process is achieved
by applying the sets of transformation rules defined in our proposal. This transforma-
tion is composed of two steps:
 The transformation from conceptual to logical model. This is a model-to-model
transformation that generates a logical OLAP model that is independent from the
end-user tool used. This transformation has been defined by using QVT rules.
These allow us to establish relational mappings between models, in which each
mapping or rule defines what particular elements we wish to check in the source
model, which element we create or modify in the target model, and how that
mapping has to be done.
 Code generation from the logical model. This is a model-to-text transformation
that generates the final implementation for a specific OLAP tool. This transfor-
mation has been defined by using MOFScript transformations that indicate map-
pings between the source model and target text files.
3.1. An introduction to the SECDW UML profile
SECDW [15] is a UML profile which has been defined previously in order to allow secure
conceptual modeling of the DW. It is based on a UML profile created specifically for
conceptual modeling of DWs,complemented with an Access Control and Audit (ACA)
model [14] which includes security capabilities in the conceptual design by considering
several security policies (Discretional Access Control, DAC; Mandatory Access Control,
MAC; and Role-Based Access Control, RBAC). The SECDW has been improved in this
paper so as to include support for the definition and transformation of complex security
rules.
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Figure 2 shows the SECDW profile. It permits the conceptual modeling of DW struc-
tural aspects by using packages (SecurePackage metaclass); classes (SecureClass) for
facts (SFact), dimensions (SDimension) and bases (SBase); properties (SecureProperty).
The security configuration of the system which we wish to model is defined by using three
points of view: a hierarchical structure of Security Roles (SRole); a list of Security Levels
(SLevel) with the clearance levels of the users; and a set of horizontal Security Compart-
ments or groups (SCompartment). Once this configuration has been established, sets of
certain security configurations composed of roles, levels and compartments can be defined
as instances of secure information (SecureInformation). The security configuration for the
elements of our conceptual model (packages, classes, attributes, etc.) is thus established
by associating them with specific secure information instances. In addition, since the user
profile (UserProfile) defines all the properties that the systems manage from users, it also
has security information associated with it.
The ACA model enables three kinds of security rules to be defined (SConstraint) for
the different elements of the DW by using Object Constraint Language (OCL) notes: the
definition of sensitive information for multidimensional elements by sensitive information
assignment rules (SIAR); the authorization or denegation of certain elements to specific
subjects by authorization rules (AUR); and the inclusion of audit rules (AR) to ensure that
authorized users do not misuse their privileges.
These rules could be complex, involving information about subjects, objects, con-
ditions, security information, privileges, log types, etc. They were represented in the
SECDW profile by using OCL notes associated with a certain multidimensional element,
but these OCL expressions are difficult to analyze and transform in an automatic way. It
is for that reason that in this paper the SECDW has been improved to provide a better
representation and management of complex security rules, by including the information
needed to support their transformation. This improvement does not affect our complete
MDA architecture and our previously-defined transformations.
Security rules have been included as subclasses of SConstraint. SIAR security rules
therefore use a SecurityRule metaclass representing conditions with boolean expressions
and the secure information that will be assigned, whether the condition is satisfied or
not. AUR rules use an AuthorizationRule metaclass with information about the security
information associated, the sign of the authorization (positive or negative), the privilege
(read, insert, update, delete, all) and a boolean expression for conditions. Finally, AR
rules are specified by an AuditRule metaclass defining the access attempt and the logged
information (subject, object, action, time and response).
Finally, our ACA model also includes a process of conflict resolution. Each structural
element can have its security labels associated ; this operation is carried out by designers
who could very well assign incorrect security privileges. When aggregations are carried
out, the security labels defined are considered but this conflict resolution process is also
applied.
3.2. Logical Metamodel for Secure OLAP Applications
This section presents a multidimensional logical metamodel (PSM), called SECMDDW
(Secure Multidimensional Data Warehouse), which enables there to be a specification of
both the structural and the security aspects that are closest to OLAP applications. The
SECMDDWmetamodel has been developed based on the CWMmetamodels [40], which
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+sLevels: SLevel [*]
+sRoles: SRole [*]
+sCompartments: SCompartment [*]
+privileges: Privilege [*]
+attempts: Attempt [*]
+logInfos: LogInfo [*]
+sInformations: SecureInformation [*]
+up: UserProﬁle
<<stereotype>>
SecurePackage
Package
Property
Class
+ownedSecInf: SecureInformation [0..1]
<<stereotype>>
SecureProperty
+ownedSCObjects: SecureClass [*]
+ownedSPObjects: SecureProperty [*]
<<stereotype>>
SConstraint
+condition: String
+thenSecInf: SecureInformation
+elseSecInf: SecureInformation [0..1]
<<stereotype>>
SecurityRule
+subjects: SecureInformation
+condition: String [0..1]
+sign: String
+privilege: Privilege
<<stereotype>>
AuthorizationRule
+logType: Attempt
+logInfos: LogInfo [*]
<<stereotype>>
AuditRuleConstraint
<<stereotype>>
SFact
<<stereotype>>
SDimension
<<stereotype>>
SBase
+properties: SecureProperty [*]
+ownedSecInf: SecureInformation [0..1]
<<stereotype>>
SecureClass
+sLevel: SLevel [0..1]
+sRoles: SRole [*]
+sCompartments: SCompartment [*]
<<stereotype>>
SecureInformation
+name: String
<<stereotype>>
SCompartment
+name: String
<<stereotype>>
SRole
+name: String
<<stereotype>>
SLevel
+infLevel+supLevel
+root
+child
*
*
* *
*
*
+ownedMember
+id: String
+name: String
+ownedSecInf: 
SecureInformation
+ownedProperties: 
Property [0..*]
<<stereotype>>
UserProﬁle
+involvedClasses: SecureClass [2..*]
+ownedSecInf: SecureInformation
<<stereotype>>
JointRule
+ownedSecureJoints
0..1
*
Primitive
Type
+name: String
<<stereotype>>
Privilege
+name: String
<<stereotype>>
Attempt
+name: String
<<stereotype>>
LogInfo
0..1
0..1
*
+rootBases
+childBases
+ownedSFacts
+ownedSBases
+ownedSDimensions+ownedSDimensions
*
Fig. 2. Profile for conceptual modelling of Secure DWs (SECDW)
is the OMG proposal for representing and interchanging metadata for data warehousing
and business intelligence. SECMDDW extends the OLAP package of CWM which fo-
cuses on data analysis and defines a metamodel of essential OLAP concepts common to
most OLAP applications.
Figure 3 shows the logical metamodel for the secure OLAP applications developed.
Three main parts can be identified: security configuration (the upper part of the Figure
3), cubes (middle part) and dimensions (bottom part). The security configuration of the
system is represented by considering a role-based access control (RBAC) policy which is
used by most of the OLAP tools. Since conceptual models are more abstract than logical
models, there is a semantic loss when we move towards lower levels. At the conceptual
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level, the SECDW considers the definition of the security configuration by using roles,
levels and compartments, but at the logical level our metamodel focuses only on RBAC
and security levels, and compartments should be adapted as security roles. That is, the se-
curity configuration is defined as a set of security roles (Role metaclass) with relationships
between them, creating a hierarchy (child and parent properties).
S
c
h
e
m
a
C
u
b
e
s
Cube
+cubeID: String
+cubeName: String
SecurityPermission
+spID: String
+spName: String
+allowedSet: String [0..1]
+deniedSet: String [0..1]
+cubePermissions
CubeRegion
+crID: String
+crName: String
Dimension
+dimensionID: String
+dimensionName: String
Hierarchy
+hierarchyID: String
+hierarchyName: String
MemberPermission
+mpID: String
+mpName: String
+allowedSet: String [0..1]
+deniedSet: String [0..1]
Schema
+ID: String
+name: String
+cubes
+dimensions
+cubeRegions
+members
+hierarchies
*
*
*
*
*
*
1
*
Level
+levelID: String
+levelName: String
*
+levels
Role
+roleID: String
+roleName: String
+roles
*
D
im
e
n
s
io
n
s
CubeRegionMember
*
+schema
1
1 +schema
+cube
1
+cube
+cubes
1..*
+levels+hierarchies
*
1
1
1
+dimension
+dimension
*
1 +dimension
+cubeRegions
+members
*
1
+keyMember
1
+dimension
+member
1
+dimensions
*
1
+schema
DimensionMember
Member
+memberID: String
+memberName: String
*
+dimension
+memberPermissions
+dimensionPermissions
*
CubePermission
DimensionPermission
* +members
0..1 +level
+parent
+child*
0..1
{complete, disjoint}
{complete, disjoint}
{complete, disjoint}
{complete, disjoint}
+roleID 1..*
Fig. 3. Logical Metamodel for Secure OLAP applications (SECMDDW).
The remaining parts of our metamodel define both structural and security aspects for
cubes and dimensions. Fact classes from our conceptual model are defined at the logi-
cal level as cubes (Cube metaclass), and their related attributes are defined as measures
(CubeRegion and CubeRegionMember metaclasses). In addition, conceptual dimension
classes are defined as dimensions (Dimension metaclass) with a set of attributes and an
identifier (DimensionMember metaclass). Base classes from conceptual models are spec-
ified as attributes related to the corresponding dimension, therefore creating the necessary
hierarchies (Hierarchy and Level metaclasses).
Considering the abstraction gap between the conceptual and logical levels, security
rules (SIAR and AUR) from conceptual models (including complex security rules defined
with OCL expressions) have been represented at the logical level by using sets of security
permissions associated with cubes, cells, dimensions and attributes. Nevertheless, since
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OLAP platforms provide specific auditing tools which are directly managed by adminis-
trators, audit rules (AR) have not been transformed into the logical model.
The SIAR and AUR security rules specified in conceptual models related to fact
classes are defined in logical models as permissions associated with the corresponding
cubes (CubePermission metaclass). Each cube permission is related to a certain security
role (roleID attribute) and uses expressions to establish the information which has to be
shown or hidden for that role (allowedSet and deniedSet attributes). These expressions
are defined in MDX syntax, and once the system is deployed they are used to evaluate
at run time the information that has to be provided to the user. Since our model allows
security rules to be established in a positive or negative way, two sets have been defined
(allowedSet for expressions that grant access and deniedSet for denying access). In this
way, each permission can be defined by one set (allowed or denied) or by the combination
of both.
This metamodel also makes it possible to establish fine grain permissions over cube
measures by using member permissions associated with the corresponding measure (Mem-
berPermission metaclass).
In addition, security constraints established in conceptual models involving dimen-
sion and base classes are defined at the logical level as permissions associated with di-
mensions (DimensionPermission metaclass) by including information about the security
role (roleID attribute) and conditions with the information which can be accessed or not
for that role (allowedSet and deniedSet attributes). The definition of fine grain security
constraints is also permitted, with the use of attribute permissions associated with the
corresponding attributes (MemberPermission metaclass).
3.3. Generating a Secure OLAP Implementation
This section shows the transformations which have been developed in order to automat-
ically generate the secure OLAP implementation from conceptual models. This process
is composed of two stages: a model-to-model transformation from conceptual models to
logical models; and a model-to-text transformation from logical model to the final im-
plementation into a specific OLAP tool, SSAS. Although it is possible to find many lan-
guages to implement transformations (QVT [42], ATL, MOFScript, JET, Xpand, etc.), in
this paper we use the standards proposed by the OMG, QVT and MOFScript.
Transformation from Conceptual Models into Logical Models for OLAP Applica-
tions At the first stage we specify the transformation rules needed for the generation of
logical models for secure OLAP applications (according to SECMDDW) from conceptual
models (according to the SECDW). The mapping between conceptual and logical mod-
els has been organized into five main QVT transformations for processing (i) the security
configuration, (ii) facts, (iii) dimensions and (iv and v) security rules. Each transformation
is composed of a top relation that starts the execution of several auxiliary rules (relations).
Processing Security Configuration. Firstly, the transformation SECDW2Role gener-
ates the security configuration for the OLAP system by using a role-based access control
(RBAC) policy. Our conceptual model is richer than our logical model, allowing the defi-
nition of security roles (SR), levels (SL) and compartments (SC). All this information has
to be adapted to role hierarchies inferring the necessary security roles.
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The top relation SecurePackage2RoleSchema explores the source model (the con-
ceptual model), looking for the security information associated with the DW (that is
composed of security levels, roles and compartments). For each SecurePackage found,
a Schema element is created in the target model (the logical model). Then the relations
SCompartment2Role, SLevel2Role and SRole2Role generate roles for each security com-
partment, level and role defined in the secure package. Furthermore, they associate these
roles in hierarchies, in order to represent the structures defined in the conceptual model (a
sequence of levels, a hierarchy of roles and a set of compartments).
Processing Facts. The transformation SECDW2Cube analyzes both the structural as-
pects and the security information associated with fact classes, creating in the logical
model cubes, measures and security permissions attached to these multidimensional ele-
ments.
This transformation is composed of a top relation SPackage2CubeSchema, as well
as several auxiliary rules for structural aspects and security permissions for cubes and
measures. Firstly, structural rules create for each secure fact class a cube with a measure
group, composed of several measures (fact attributes in the conceptual model). After this,
security relations process the security information (roles, levels and compartments) as-
sociated with fact classes and their attributes, in order to generate security permissions
associated with cubes and their measures (cube cells) in the logical model. These security
permissions are adapted to the RBAC policy used in the logical level, including also the
multidimensional expressions (MDX) needed to specify the information that have to be
shown and hidden with respect to each role.
Using the QVT graphical syntax Figure 4 shows a detailed view of the SFact2Cube re-
lation. The way in which the security information associated with SFact classes and their
attributes are processed by other relations can be shown in the where clause of the relation
(see bottom side of the Figure 4). Firstly, security compartments, roles and levels defined
over SFact classes are analyzed, creating security permissions that affect the Cube as a
whole (CubePermission). For instance, the relation SCompartmentClass2CubePermission
focuses on the security compartments, and creates cube permissions authorizing the ac-
cess to the cube for the roles involved (which are the representation of these compartments
as roles in the logical model). The relation DenySCompartmentClass2CubePermission
then creates cube permissions, denying access to the remaining security compartments.
Processing Dimensions and Bases.
The secure dimension and base classes defined in the conceptual model are pro-
cessed by the transformation SECDW2Dimension, which generates dimensions, bases,
attributes, hierarchies and security permissions in the logical model, defined over dimen-
sions and attributes.
In the logical model, this creates dimensions with a key attribute and the remaining
attributes. In addition, the remaining structural relations analyze the secure base classes,
defining classification hierarchies, aggregation levels and attributes. The remaining rela-
tions then go on to process the security information (roles, levels and compartments) as-
sociated with dimension classes, base classes or their attributes. These relations transform
the security constraints to the semantics used in the logical model; that is, they define se-
curity permissions using an RBAC security policy and MDX expressions to show or hide
certain multidimensional OLAP elements (a dimension, an aggregation level, etc.).
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rols=OWNMEMB->select(d:SECDW::Class|d.oclIsKindOf(SECDW::SRole));
rolRoot=rols->select(r:SECDW::SRole | r.parent.oclIsUndeﬁned()).ﬁrst();
--Cube Permissions
if(secInf.oclIsUndeﬁned()) then true else
          --Authorizing and Denying Security Compartments
if(secInf.securityCompartments->size()>0)->forAll(scTmp:SECDW::SCompartment | 
          SCompartmentClass2CubePermission(sf,scTmp,'','',s)) and 
          DenySCompartmentClass2CubePermission(sp,sf,sfName,s)
else true endif and
          --Authorizing and Denying Security Roles
if(secInf.securityRoles->size()>0)->forAll(sr:SECDW::SRole | SRoleDescendant2CubePermission(sf,"+",sr,'','',s)) 
          and DenySRoleNonDescendant2CubePermission(secInf,sf,"-",rolRoot,'',sfName,s)
else true endif and
          --Authorizing and Denying Security Levels
if(secInf.securityLevel->size()>0) then
SLevelClass2CubePermission(sf,secInf.securityLevel,'+','','',s) and
SLevelClass2CubePermission(sf,secInf.securityLevel.infLevel,'-','',sfName,s)
else  true endif 
endif;
--Cell Permissions
SecureProperty2CellPermission (sp,sf,s);
   Where   
SFact2Cube
name = spName
ownedember = OWNMEM
sp: SecurePackage
ID = spName
name = spName
s: Schema
<<domain>>
<<domain>>
C E
name = sfName
ownedSecInf = secInf
sf: SFact
cubeID = sfName
cubeName = sfName
ownedCubes: Cube
C
<<domain>>
Fig. 4. Graphical notation for the relation SFact2Cube.
Processing Security Rules. Finally, the security rules (SIAR and AUR) defined in
the conceptual model are processed. Since these rules can involve several multidimen-
sional elements and the evaluation of conditions, it is necessary to create additional se-
curity permissions with MDX expressions, which are associated to cubes and dimensions
(or to cube cells and dimension attributes if fine grain security permissions are needed).
The transformation SecurityRule2CubePermission processes security rules attached to se-
cure fact classes and their attributes, while SecurityRule2DimensionPermission processes
those associated with dimension and base classes and their attributes.
SIAR rules are transformed by analyzing the security information expressed in the
SIAR and generating security permissions for the authorized and unauthorized security
roles at the logical level (which represent security compartments, roles and levels from
the conceptual model). These security permissions include MDX expressions with the
condition established in the SIAR, in order to hide the instances that satisfy the condition.
AUR rules are transformed into a set of positive or negative permissions, depending on
the AUR sign. The set of permissions created authorizes or denies all the roles that are
affected by the rule.
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Generating a Secure SSAS Implementation from Logical Models Logical models
defined according to SECMDDW are very close to OLAP platforms. They define the
structure and security of the DW by using multidimensional OLAP elements; the auto-
matic transformation towards a secure implementation for different OLAP tools can thus
be easily achieved by adapting this information to the syntax of each OLAP tool. To in-
corporate support for a specific OLAP tool in our architecture it is necessary to define a
model-to-text transformation, from the logical model to the specific syntax of the end-user
tool.
In this paper, we have developed the set of MOFScript transformations needed to
obtain a secure implementation for SSAS automatically. SSAS uses several kinds of XML
files (with role, cube and dim file extensions) to manage information about security roles,
cubes and dimension. The MOFScript transformation developed to generate the secure
SSAS implementation from logical models has therefore been grouped into three sets,
namely security configuration, cubes and dimensions.
In the first place, the security configuration established in the logical model by using
a RBAC policy is processed. For each role, an XML file (with role file extension) with
information about its members is created. Structural and security aspects related to cubes
are then analyzed. This creates a cube file (cube file extension) for each cube detected
in the logical model, including information about this cube and its measures. Cube files
are then fulfilled by other transformations which include the remaining information about
hierarchies and security permissions defined for cubes and cells.
Finally, dimensions are processed by the transformation shown in Listing 1.1. That
creates the dimension files needed (dim file extension), as well as the structural aspects
related to dimensions. After that, the security permissions defined for this dimension,
or their attributes, are analyzed; the security information needed is included in the cor-
responding dimension file: information about processing and reading privileges, MDX
expressions defining the sets which are denied and allowed for each role, etc. (see Listing
1.1).
Listing 1.1.MOFScript transformation: dimensions
t e x t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n d imen s i o nPe rm i s s i o n s ( i n psm : S E CMDDW )f
psm . Schema : : main ( )f
s e l f . cubes >f o rEach ( c : psm . Cube )f
c . d imens ions >f o rEach ( d : psm . Dimension )f
f i l e d im f i l e ( d . d imens ionID + . d i m ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <Dimens ionPe rmi s s i ons> ) ;
d . d imen s i o nPe rm i s s i o n s
 >f o rEach ( dp : psm . D imens ionPe rmi s s i on )f
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <Dimens ionPe rmis s ion> ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <ID> +dp . dpID+ </ID> ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <Name> +dp . dpName+ </Name> ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <RoleID> +dp . r o l e ID+ </RoleID> ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <Proce s s> +dp . p r o c e s s + </ P roce s s> ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <Read> +dp . r e ad + </Read> ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <AllowedSet> +dp . a l l owedSe t + </Al lowedSet> ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <DeniedSet> +dp . d e n i e dS e t + </DeniedSet> ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <A t t r i b u t e P e rm i s s i o n s> ) ;
dp . a t t r i b u t e P e r m i s s i o n s
 >f o rEach ( ap : psm . A t t r i b u t e P e rm i s s i o n )f
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <A t t r i b u t e P e rm i s s i o n> ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <At t r i b u t e ID> +ap . a t t r i b u t e I D + </ A t t r i b u t e ID> ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <AllowedSet> +ap . a l l owedSe t + </Al lowedSet> ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( <DeniedSet> +ap . d e n i e dS e t + </DeniedSet> ) ;
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( </ A t t r i b u t e P e rm i s s i o n> ) ;g
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( </ A t t r i b u t e P e rm i s s i o n s> ) ;
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d im f i l e . p r i n t ( </D imens ionPe rmis s ion> ) ;g
d im f i l e . p r i n t ( </D imens ionPe rmi s s i ons> ) ;g g g
4. Application Example
This section describes the application of our proposal for the development of an OLAP
application for a sales department. The DW used in this example analyzes sales according
to different perspectives (products, dates, customers and stores), and also considers several
security constraints. First of all, the system is modeled at a conceptual level. The secure
logical model for OLAP applications is then obtained automatically (by applying the QVT
transformations defined). Finally, the secure implementation for SSAS is obtained from
the logical model automatically (by applying the MOFScript rules developed).
4.1. Conceptual Model
Figure 5 shows the conceptual model for the Sales DW, defined according to the SECDW.
This example is composed of a central fact Sale (secure fact class) with measures amount
and quantity, which can be classified by using different dimensions Product, Store, Date
and Customer (secure dimension classes). Furthermore, different aggregation levels have
been defined (by using secure base classes) for Products which can be grouped by Cate-
gory and by Customers, which can in turn be grouped by City.
+amount
+quantity
<<SFact>>
Sale
{SL = U}
+customerID
+name
+age
+address
<<SDimension>>
Customer
{SL = C}
+storeID
+storeDesc
<<SDimension>>
Store
{SL = C}
+productID
+productDesc
+delivery
<<SDimension>>
Product
{SL = C}
+dateID
+dateDesc
<<SDimension>>
Date
{SL = U}
+cityID
+cityDesc
<<SBase>>
City
{SL = U}
+categoryID
+categoryDesc
<<SBase>>
Category
{SL = U}
+userCode
+userName
+securityLevel
<<UserProﬁle>>
UserProﬁle
+CABExp = "[Product].[delivery]==anonymous"
+CATHENSecInf = {SL=S}
+CAELSESecInf = {SL=C}
<<SecurityRule>>
SIARProduct
+ExceptSign = '+'
+ExceptPrivilege = 'read'
+CABExp = "[Customer].[customerID]==[UserProﬁle].[userCode]"
<<AuthorizationRule>>
AURCustomer
*
*
*
*
*
*
ownedSFacts
ownedSDimensions
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
sConstraints
ownedSCObjects
ownedSCObjects
sConstraints
ownedSDimensions
ownedSDimensions
ownedSDimensions
ownedSDimensions
ownedSDimensions
ownedSBases
ownedSBases
1
ownedSFacts
ownedSFacts
ownedSFacts
Fig. 5. Example: Conceptual Model (PIM).
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In addition, the security configuration is established. Although our proposal allows us
to specify security roles, levels and compartments, this example considers only the follow-
ing set of security levels: secret (S), confidential (C) and undefined (U). The user profile
therefore stores the security level associated with the user, as well as information about
their identification and name. Security constraints have been established for multidimen-
sional elements by using this security configuration, that is, by using security information
sets composed of a specific security level requiredThe security privileges needed to access
fact, dimension and base classes are defined first of all (as tagged values): a security level
of C is required to access Product, Store and Customer dimensions; and a level of U for
the fact Sale, dimension Date and bases Category and City.
Several security rules complement the model, moreover. A security rule (SIAR) is
attached to the Product dimension, which increases the security level needed to access
sales information grouped by Product from C to S if the kind of delivery is anonymous (
the delivery property from the Product dimension). An authorization rule (AUR) attached
to Customer allows each user to access their own customers information (although the
users security level was lower than the one required for Customer, which is C).
4.2. Logical OLAP Model
Once the conceptual model has been defined, the transformation rules developed are ap-
plied, in order to obtain a logical model for secure OLAP applications (according to
SECMDDW metamodel). The resulting logical model is shown, split into several fig-
ures. The security configuration defined is analyzed first of all, by the transformation
SECDW2Role. In this case, as can be seen in Figure 6, several roles (SLS, SLC and SLU)
are created for each security level from the conceptual model (S, C and U).
Sales : Schema
SLC : RoleSLS : Role SLU : Role
schema roles
Fig. 6. Example: Logical Model (PSM). Security Configuration.
Secure fact classes defined in the conceptual model are processed by SECDW2Cube
transformation. The secure fact class Sale generates a cube (Cube) with a measure group
(MeasureGroup) composed of two measures (Measure): amount and quantity (see Figure
7). The security level required for access to the Sale secure fact class (a U security level)
is represented in the logical model as a set of positive security cube permissions which
grant access (process and read attributes) to the cube Sale (allowedSet attribute) for the
role SLU (roleID attribute), as well as for the roles SLC and SLC, since these represent
users with higher security privileges (upper security level).
After this, both the structural and the security aspects related to dimension and base
classes are analyzed by the transformation SECDW2Dimension. As Figure 8 shows, each
secure dimension class from the conceptual model generates a dimension (Dimension)
in the logical model, with associated attributes and a key attribute for each dimension
(Member). The different classification hierarchies defined for each dimension with secure
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roleID = "SLS"
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = [Sale]
deniedSet = ""
CubePermissionSLS : 
CubePermission
roleID = "SLC"
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = [Sale]
deniedSet = ""
CubePermissionSLC : 
CubePermission
roleID = "SLU"
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = [Sale]
deniedSet = ""
CubePermissionSLU : 
CubePermission
Sale : Cube
Sale : 
CubeRegion
amount : 
CubeRegionMember
quantity : 
CubeRegionMember
Sales : Schema
members
cubeRegions
cubePermissions
cube
schema
cube
cube
cubeRegions
Fig. 7. Example: Logical Model (PSM). Cubes.
base classes in the conceptual level are specified in the logical model as hierarchies (Hier-
archy) and different aggregation levels (Level) associated with dimensions (for instance,
Customer can be grouped by City). The properties of the base are represented as dimen-
sion attributes in the logical level (for instance, cityID and cityDesc from the base City
are now attributes of the Customer dimension).
Sale : Cube
Customer : 
Dimension Product : 
Dimension
productID : 
Member
productDesc : 
Member
delivery :  
Member
categoryID :  
Member
categoryDesc : 
Member
address : 
Member
age :  
Member
customerID : 
Member
name : 
Member
cityID: 
Member
cityDesc: 
Member
Store : 
Dimension
storeID :  
Member
storeDesc :  
Member
Date : 
Dimension
dateID : 
Member
dateDesc :  
Member
CustomerHierarchy1 : 
Hierarchy
ProductHierarchy1 : 
Hierarchy
sourceAttributeID = "City"
City : Level
sourceAttributeID = "Category"
Category : Level
Sales : Schema
schema cube cube dimensions
keyMember
keyMember
keyMember
keyMember
members
members
members
members
dimensions
hierarchies levels
levels
hierarchies
Fig. 8. Example: Logical Model (PSM). Dimensions Structure.
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The security privileges needed to access dimensions and bases are modeled at the
logical level as dimension permissions (as can be shown in Figure 9). Since a security
level of C is required to access the dimension Store, three security dimension permissions
have been defined: two of them to grant access for users with roles SLS and SLC (security
levels S and C), and one of them to deny access for users with an SLU role (security
level U). The remainder of the dimension permissions in Figure 9 is associated with the
dimension Date and these are obtained in a similar way.
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = ""
deniedSet = "[Store]"
DimensionPermissionSLU : 
DimensionPermission
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = "[Store]"
deniedSet = ""
DimensionPermissionSLC : 
DimensionPermission
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = "[Store]"
deniedSet = ""
DimensionPermissionSLS : 
DimensionPermission
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = "[Date]"
deniedSet = ""
DimensionPermissionSLU : 
DimensionPermission
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = "[Date]"
deniedSet = ""
DimensionPermissionSLC : 
DimensionPermission
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = "[Date]"
deniedSet = ""
DimensionPermissionSLS : 
DimensionPermission
Sale : Cube
Customer : 
Dimension
Product : 
Dimension
Store : Dimension
Date : Dimension
Sales : Schema
cube
dimensions
dimensionPermissions
SLS : Role SLC : Role SLU : Role
roleID roleID roleID
SLS : Role SLC : Role SLU : Role
roleID roleID roleID
dimensionPermissions
Fig. 9. Example: Logical Model (PSM). Dimensions Security.
The dimension and attribute permissions needed at the logical level to represent the
security constraints that affect the Product dimension and their associated base class Cate-
gory are shown in Figure 10. First, dimension permissions are created for each role (SLS,
SLC and SLU). The security level required to access Product is C, but there is also a se-
curity rule (SIAR) that increases this to S when the kind of delivery is anonymous. The
transformation SecurityRules2DimensionPermission processes this SIAR, generating di-
mension permissions that represent this situation by using allowed and denied sets: SLS
role can access all products, with anonymous delivery or not (thus, the allowedSet is set to
[Product]); SLC role can only access products with non- anonymous delivery (deniedSet
set to [Product].[delivery] == anonymous); and SLU role cannot access any product (de-
niedSet set to [Product]). Nevertheless, the last dimension permission denies all accesses
to products for the SLU role, and in the conceptual model, the security level required for
the base class Category is U. In order to provide access to Category information (catego-
ryID and categoryName properties) for the role SLU, positive attribute permissions for
the attributes CategorycategoryID and CategorycategoryName are created in the logical
model attached to the dimension permission corresponding to the role SLU.
Dimension permissions associated with the Customer dimension are shown in Fig-
ure 11. In the conceptual model a security level of C for Customer dimension was es-
tablished, and U was determined for the City base. Security dimension permissions are
created in the logical model for each role: granting access for SLS and SLC, and denying
access for SLU. Furthermore, since users with a U security level cab see City informa-
tion, positive attribute permissions for their attributes (CitycityID and CitycityName) are
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process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = "[Product]"
deniedSet = ""
DimensionPermissionSLS : 
DimensionPermission
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = ""
deniedSet = "[Product].[delivery]==anonymous"
DimensionPermissionSLC : 
DimensionPermission
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = ""
deniedSet = "[Product]"
DimensionPermissionSLU : 
DimensionPermission
allowedSet = "[Product].[categoryID]"
deniedSet = ""
mpCategoryID : MemberPermission
allowedSet = "[Product].[categoryDesc]"
deniedSet = ""
mpCategoryDesc : MemberPermission
Sale : Cube Product : DimensionSales : Schema
cube dimensions
dimensionPermissions
memberPermissions
SLS : Role
SLC : Role
SLU : Role
roleID roleID
roleID
Fig. 10. Example: Logical Model (PSM). Security Rules.
attached to the dimension permission for the role SLU. Nevertheless, an authorization rule
(AUR) allows users to access their own customer information. The transformation Securi-
tyRule2DimensionPermission changes the information needed to represent this constraint
in the logical model. In this case, since SLS and SLC roles can access all Customer in-
formation, only the dimension permission for the SLU role has to be modified, by setting
the allowed set to the condition [Customer].[customerID]==[UserProfile].[userCode].
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = "[Customer].[customerID]==[UserProﬁle].[userCode]"
deniedSet = ""
DimensionPermissionSLU : DimensionPermission
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = "[Customer]"
deniedSet = ""
DimensionPermissionSLC : 
DimensionPermission
process = true
read = allowed
allowedSet = "[Customer]"
deniedSet = ""
DimensionPermissionSLS : 
DimensionPermission
allowedSet = "[Customer].[cityID]"
deniedSet = ""
mpCityID : MemberPermission
allowedSet = "[Customer].[cityDesc]"
deniedSet = ""
mpCityDesc : MemberPermission
Sale : Cube Customer : DimensionSales : Schema
memberPermissions
dimensionPermissions
dimensionscube
SLU : Role
roleID
SLS : Role
SLC : Role
roleID roleID
Fig. 11. Example: Logical Model (PSM). Authorization Rules.
4.3. Implementation into SSAS
The logical model obtained in the previous section is now transformed into secure code for
SSAS by applying the MOFScript rules defined. This transformations generate different
kind of files: for each security role (files SLS.role, SLC.role and SLU.role); for the Sales
cube (Sales.cube file); and for each dimension (files Product.dim, Customer.dim, etc.).
Listing 1.2 shows a piece of code from the Product.dim file, in which it can be shown
how the dimension permission for the role SLU has been represented for SSAS by using
its XML syntax and MDX expressions for the allowed and denied sets.
Listing 1.2.MOFScript transformation: dimensions
<Dimension>
<ID>Produc t</ID><Name>Produc t</Name>
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<!  S t r u c t u r a l a s p e c t s have been omi t t ed  >
<Dimens ionPe rmi s s i ons>
<!  Dimension P e rm i s s i o n s f o r SLS and SLC have been omi t t ed  >
<Dimens ionPe rmis s ion>
<ID>DimensionPermiss ionSLU</ID>
<Name>DimensionPermiss ionSLU</Name>
<RoleID>SLU</RoleID>
<Proce s s>t r u e </ P roce s s>
<Read>Allowed</Read>
<AllowedSet></Al lowedSet>
<DeniedSet>[P r oduc t ]</ DeniedSet>
<A t t r i b u t e P e rm i s s i o n s>
<A t t r i b u t e P e rm i s s i o n>
<At t r i b u t e ID>Ca t ego ryca t ego ry ID </ A t t r i b u t e ID>
<AllowedSet>[P r oduc t ] . [ Ca t e go r y c a t e go r y ID ]</ Al lowedSet>
<DeniedSet></DeniedSet>
</ A t t r i b u t e P e rm i s s i o n>
<A t t r i b u t e P e rm i s s i o n>
<At t r i b u t e ID>Ca t ego ryca t ego ryDesc </ A t t r i b u t e ID>
<AllowedSet>[P r oduc t ] . [ Ca t e go r y c a t e go r yDe s c ]</ Al lowedSet>
<DeniedSet></DeniedSet>
</ A t t r i b u t e P e rm i s s i o n>
</ A t t r i b u t e P e rm i s s i o n s>
</D imens ionPe rmis s ion>
</D imens ionPe rmi s s i ons>
</Dimension>
5. Conclusions
DWs manage vital business information which is very sensitive and which has to be cor-
rectly assured in order to avoid unauthorized access. Furthermore, since DWs are queried
by OLAP tools which managed specific views from the corporative DW, security con-
straints should also be defined in this metadata layer by using the same multidimensional
elements that will be managed by the end users of OLAP tools.
Thanks to our proposal we are able to develop secure OLAP applications, providing
a complete MDA architecture composed of several security models and automatic trans-
formations towards final secure implementation. That is: (i) a new logical metamodel
(SECMDDW) for secure OLAP applications, based on the OLAP package of CWM; (ii)
a set of model-to-model transformations from our conceptual models (PIM) to the new
OLAP logical models (PSM); and (iii) the model-to-text transformations for generating
code for a specific OLAP tool (SSAS) from the new OLAP logical models (PSM).
Furthermore, an application example has been presented to validate our proposal, an
example in which a conceptual model is defined; transformation rules are applied to gener-
ate the secure multidimensional logical model and the eventual implementation in SSAS.
The validation of our proposal has been planned in several stages. In this paper, we have
presented an application example that helped us carry out an early evaluation. This appli-
cation example includes a great variety of the structural and security elements which allow
us to evaluate the applicability of the proposed models and transformations, enabling us
to improve them. Nevertheless, as future work we consider it necessary to include a sub-
sequent stage to complete the evaluation of our architecture by applying it to industrial
case studies with the participation of professional designers. We will also define a fam-
ily of experiments in order to measure the improvement obtained in comparison to the
traditional development process.
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Our further work will improve this architecture in several lines: (i) including new PSM
models, giving support to other final platforms (such as Pentaho); (ii) defining inverse
transformations to allow modernization processes; and (iii) including dynamic security
models which complement the existing models that deal with the security problem of
inference.
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